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is for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's next of kin; and, while the
decedent's administrator alone may sue, his relation to any fund recov-
ered is not that of the decedent's representative, but that of trustee for
the next of kin. It would, therefore, seem the thing to do to admit any
defense against him which would be a defense against them."
The possibility of now joining the beneficiary with the decedent in
the release, in many cases, does not help to counteract the unfortunate
result of Ohio's position on the effect of a release by the decedent alone.
There are still problems presented where the beneficiaries are minors
and cannot release, or where the tort-feasor overlooks or does not know
of one or more of the beneficiaries (especially if he be a non-resident of
the state), and thus a necessary signature is missing from the release.
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THE RIGHT OF CREDITORS TO REACH THE CESTUI'S INTEREST
The defendant and his wife conveyed certain property to trustees
under a trust device, naming themselves and their five children, or their
heirs as beneficiaries. It was provided that the defendant was to receive
one thousand dollars a year from the income of the fund so long as he
acted as the manager of a business enterprise and thereafter he was to
receive five hundred dollars per year for life in the form of a pension,
but in the event the business were unprofitable for three years the
trustee was authorized to sell the property and distribute the proceeds
as therein provided, in which event the defendant was not to participate
in the distribution. The plaintiffs subsequently recovered a judgment
against the defendant and execution was returned unsatisfied. They
then sought, by proceedings in aid of execution, to subject his interest
in the trust to the payment of their claim. The defendant's salary
account was overdrawn at the time these proceedings were instituted.
The court denied recovery to the plaintiffs, saying that the defendant's
interest in the fund "is too uncertain as to duration to be subject of an
order in aid, except as to definite sums as they accrue to him."* This
*Kuhn, et al.t v. Wolf, 59 Ohio App. iS (1938).
case is illustrative of the problem facing the creditor whose debtor is the
cestui of trust having no other property subject to the payment of his
obligations.
In undertaking to set forth the principles governing creditors' pro-
cedure in reaching such interests, the first part of this paper will be given
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over to a discussion of the ordinary active trust in which the cestus
interest is free from all conditions, restraints or other contingencies, and
the latter part will be devoted to a consideration of some of the excep-
tions to the general rule, arising by reason of the inclusion of such clauses
in the instrument.
"At Common Law judgments could not be levied upon estates
merely equitable, because courts of law did not recognize any such titles
and could not deal with them."' Statutes have in some respect served
to alter this rule, but by and large it must be said that the equitable
interest of a cestui que trust is immune to legal levy and execution yet
today. One of the first attempts to change the rule is found in the tenth
section of the Statute of Frauds2 which provided that such interests in
lands could be levied upon in the same manner as legal estates. How-
ever, this attempt fell short of giving truly adequate relief to creditors
who found that their debtors' interests were equitable only for two
reasons; first, it extended only to realty, and second, the statute was
early construed to cover cases where the cestuis' interest was a "fee
simple," and was ultimately limited to those cases where a dry or passive
trust existed.3
It is now clearly established that equitable interests are not available
to legal execution under the Ohio statute.' In discussing the history of
that section ' Mauck, J., said, "Section 11655, General Code fixes the
power to levy and sell under an execution. For many years this section
provided only for a levy and sale of lands and tenements and goods and
chattels not exempt by law. Under that reading it was uniformly held
that only a legal tide in property could be reached by execution. In
i88o the General Assembly added, after the words 'lands and tene-
ments,' the phrase 'including vested interests therein.' In First National
Bank v. Logue, Trustee, 89 O.S. 288, io6 N.E. 21, L.R.A. 1915 B
340 (1914) it was held that, as vested interests included equitable as
well as legal interests, an equitable interest in lands and tenements could
be reached by execution. Since the decision in Bank v. Logue, the
section in question has again been amended by confining the vested
interests subject to execution to 'vested legal interests,' i i i O.L. 366.
First National Bank v. Logue, consequently is no longer authority for
interpreting Section 11655. There is therefore, no power under that
'Frcdmans Savings Etc. Co. v. Earle, 10 U.S. 710, 4 S. Ct. 2z6 (I884).
2 St. 29 Carl. II c. 3 (1676).
'King v. Ballet, z Vern. 248 (169x).
' Section ix6 5, G.C. reads as follows: "Lands and tenements, including vested legal
interests therein, permanent leasehold estates renewable forever, and goods and chattels not
e:empt by law, shall be subject to the payment of debts, and liable to be taken on execu-
tion and sold as hereinafter provided."
SHatueLwsn v. Szalay, 33 Ohio App. 350, 169 N.E. 6oz (5929).
LAW JOURNAL-DECEMBER, 1938
section now to reach equitable interests in real estate, and there never
has been any power to make execution sale thereunder of equitable
interest in personal property."
However, in spite of what has been said thus far, it has long been
recognized as a general rule of the law of trusts that the equitable
interest of the beneficiary of an active trust may be subjected to meet
the claims of his creditors. In Ohio, the law on this subject has been
well summarized by Welch, J., in Hobbs v. Smith:8 "The law makes
what a man owns, whether by legal or equitable tide, liable to the pay-
ments of his debts, unless it be property specially exempted. No legal
acumen or skill can evade this policy of the law, and as often as it is
attempted it must result in one of two things, either in the devisee taking
nothing by the will, or in leaving what he does take liable for the pay-
ment of his debts. The liability attaches to the ownership, and it is
beyond the power of any draftsman to invent a form of devise or
conveyance that shall separate them."
In order to reconcile this apparent anomaly it is necessary to look
briefly into the history of the court of chancery. Equity, relieving against
the rigors of common law, was quick to come to the aid of a creditor
who found himself without other adequate relief, and early in its juris-
diction provided a method by means of which such interests could be
reached. As Glenn has said,' "It was natural that the Court of Chancery
should extend its aid to the creditor who would otherwise have suffered
in such cases. This impulse the court recognized almost as soon as the
public began to seek its aid, as finally happened in course of time. The
ancillary' jurisdiction which thus started was invoked by what is known
as the judgment creditor's bill. The creditor, who . . . had failed to
obtain seizure of his debtor's property under execution, filed in the
Court of Chancery a bill asking that court to compel the debtor to turn
over to a receiver his interest in the property in question, so that the
court could sell it and pay the proceeds thereof to the complaining
creditor."
The early equity courts of Ohio, recognizing the inadequacy of the
legal remedy in this respect, granted the creditor a remedy through the
medium of the creditor's bill.9 While it is believed that such a bill may
5S Ohio St. 419 (1864).Glenn, "Creditors' Rights and Remedies," p. 8.
S i Bogert, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 546, raises the question at this point: Is the cred-
itor's procedure to reach the cestui's interest truly within an ancillary jurisdiction of equity,
or is it but one phase of trust enforcement, which is one of Chancery's exclusive jurisdic-
tions?
Parish v. Rhodes, et al., Wright (Ohio) 339 (1833); Edgington v. Williams, et al.,
Wright (Ohio) 4.39 (1833); Shorten, et al. v. Woodrow, 34 Ohio St. 645 (878);
Hubble v. Perrin, 3 Ohio z87 (18z7).
130
NOTES AND COMMENTS 131
still be maintained under the inherent equitable jurisdiction of our
courts,'" Ohio has enacted a statute, G.C. I176o, which provides that
equitable interests shall be reached by proceedings thereunder by the usual
code "civil action."" This section has been construed as providing the
statutory equivalent of a judgment creditor's bill.12 It is interesting to
note at this point that similar statutes in Illinois and New Jersey have
been construed as extending only to those trust interests which have been
declared by the cestui, and a creditor will be turned away in those cases
where the trust was established by third parties.'"
With the exception of Massachusetts and Connecticut,' 4 it is univer-
sally required, as a condition precedent to the maintenance of the
creditor's bill, that the complainant must have first secured a judgment
at law. This requirement is consistent with the age-old equity principle
that a complainant must first have exhausted his legal remedy before
applying to the ancillary jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. This
is the Ohio rule under section I 176o, and was also a requirement under
the former chancery procedure.'" Although it was sometimes required,
under the old equity practice, that the complainant show both a judg-
ment at law and a return of execution unsatisfied, section I I76o so far
modifies that rule that it is only necessary to show that the judgment
debtor does not have personal or real property subject to levy on execu-
tion sufilcient to satisfy the judgment.' 6 It will be observed that in the
principal case the plaintiffs had met both these requirements.
As is the case with most rules of law, the requirement that the com-
plainant first reduce his claim to a judgment prior to proceeding toward
" Ohio Jurisprudence, Vol. 40, Trusts, Sec. 211.
" This section provides: "When a judgment debtor has not personal or real property
subject to levy on execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment, any equitable interest which
he has in real estate, as mortgagor, mortgagee or otherwise, or any interest he has in
banking, turnpike, bridge or joint stock company, or in a money contract, claim or chose
in action, due or to become due to him, or in a judgment or order, or money, goods or
effects which he has in the possession of any person, or body politic or corporate, shall be
subject to the payment of the judgment, by action."
'-Dunbar v. Harrison, 18 Ohio St. 24 (1868); Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 17 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 401 (1914).
13 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1929) Chap. 22, sec. 495 x91 Ill. 598 (1gox)i 141 U.S.
796, 11 S. Ct. oo (x89o); N.J. Comp. Stats. (1910) p. 435, sec. 70; 3o N.J.E. 645
(1879)5 69 N.J.E. 337 (19o); 73 N.J.E. 59o (Igo8)5 58 N.J.L. 29 (1895).
"' Wilson v. Mlartin-Wilson Co., isi Mass. S13, 24 N.E. 784 (i8go); Barry v.
Abbott, oo Mass. 396 (z868)5 Huntington v. JaJcobs, et al., 7z Conn. 45 (1899), where
it is said: "It is not necessary in this state for a creditor to obtain judgment before he
can maintain a creditor's bill, since the judgment may be rendered in the very action in
which the equitable relief is asked."
as Hegler v. Grove, 63 Ohio St. 404 (r9oo); Hays v. Turnpike Co., i (H) C.S.C.R.
281 (1S8); Swihart v. Shaunz, 24 Ohio St. 432 (1870 Clark v. Strong, 16 Ohio
317 (1847).
10 Card v. Walbridge, zS Ohio 411 (1849).
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a creditor's bill has some exceptions. These exceptions may be dassified
into three general groups, as follows:
i. Where the creditor is entitled to payment out of a special or
trust fund.1"
2. Where the debtor is deceased or out of the jurisdiction so that a
personal judgment cannot be obtained."8
3. Where the creditor, by reason of some positive rule of law cannot
obtain a judgment and execution, as in the case of married
women and minors. 9
An Ohio case illustrating the first exception is Darst v. Pittsburgh
etc. .R. Co."0 In that case the railroad issued bonds and to secure the
payment of principal and interest, executed a deed of trust giving the
trustee the right to take possession of the debtor's property in case of
default. To provide for this payment the directors of the railroad estab-
lished a sinking fund, with directions that contributions were to be made
to this fund after payment of the expenses of operating and maintaining
the road. The plaintiff furnished materials to the railroad, and then
brought a bill in equity asking that one of the company's agents be
directed to pay over to him certain cash which he had received in the
conduct of the business. In granting relief, notwithstanding the fact
there had been no prior judgment at law, the court said "the petition
is in fact more properly in the nature of a bill to administer a trust or
enforce specific performance of a trust duty, or a charge or lien upon
a fund, all of which belong to the equity jurisdiction of courts."
Of cases falling within the second and third classes set out above it
may be said that the only remedy the creditor has is in equity and conse-
quently he cannot be expected to attempt to secure a judgment at law.
Another question which arises in creditors' suits against a cestufs
interest is that of parties to the action. It has been held by the Massa-
chusetts court" that "if it be made to appear that the . . . property
• . . is held by a trustee, it will be necessary for the plaintiff, in order to
entitle himself to a decree, to amend his bill by making the trustee a
party." Although Ohio has never had occasion to pass on this point,
a study of our code provisions would seem to make such a joinder
essential to the maintenance of the action, 2 since the trustee holds legal
17 Marion Deposit Bank v. McWilliams, z Ohio Dec. Rep. x4z (1859)i Darst v.
Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. R. Co., 3 Ohio Dec. Rep. 299 (2859).
"s Seth-Grosvenor & Co., Adm. v. Austin, et al., 6 Ohio 104 (1833); Heaton v.
Dickson & Trust Co, 153 Mo. App. 312 (1910).
"'Elliott v. Lawhead, 43 Ohio St. 171 (1885).
20 3 Ohio Dec. Rep. 199 (1859).
2' Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen (Mass.) 387 (1864).
22 G.C. ziz55 provides: "Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an
interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a necessary party to a com-
plete determination or settlement of a question involved therein."
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title. Where the order directs the trustee to pay the creditor the amount
of the claim, it is clearly established that the trustee is entitled to
indemnity, and may charge the estate with the amount of such pay-
ment. It is clear that such charges are properly credited as an expense
of administration, and "the expenses of a trustee in the execution of the
trust, are a lien upon the estate; and he will not be compelled to part
with the property until his disbursements are paid."23  However, the
procedure most likely to be pursued by the trustee in such a case is that
of exoneration. Under this procedure the trustee is entitled to demand
that the estate assume the burden that has been directed against him, thus
relieving him of liability in the matter. Since the creditor's right is
derivative and not absolute in this respect (being dependent upon the
cestu's right to claim the fund) unlike the claim of a party injured by
a tort of the trustee, the trustee will be permitted to claim exoneration,
thus avoiding any responsibility or risk of loss in the matter through the
insolvency of the cestuz.
Still a further problem may arise in connection with the creditor's
right to subject the cestus interest to payment of his claim: namely,
what extent or amount of the cestu~s interest will be taken, the income
only, or the entire trust fund including the capital? This will in part
depend upon the nature of the cestus interest, i.e., life tenant or
remainderman, for in no event will the creditor be entitled to more than
the cestui could claim. But assuming a case where the cestui is to ulti-
mately receive the entire fund, which at the time of the proceeding is
being held in trust, it is intimated by Mr. Bogert24 that this question
would be decided by the court in its discretion.
A Kentucky case which supports that position is Marshall's Trustee
v. Rash, et al.,"5 in which it was apparent that the rents and profits from
the trust res, a farm, would not meet the claim of the creditor within
a reasonable time and, consequently, the court ordered a sale of the
premises. In many cases, however, a sale of the premises is not advisable
as it may result in an unjust loss being thrown upon the cestui. This is
due to the fact that in many cases the cestui will have but a life estate,
or an interest conditioned upon some remote or contingent event and
it is a difficult, if not impossible task, to place a fair value on that interest
without working a sacrifice on the beneficiary. In such a case the court
will, upon application, appoint a receiver, who, as an officer of the court,
manages the property and turns the rents and profits over to the court
to be paid to the creditor, thus avoiding such hardships.2"
=a Rcnscllacr & S. R. Co. v. Miller, 47 Vt. 146 (1874).14 .Bogert, TRUITS AND TRUSTEE$, 544.
87 Ky. xz6 (1888).
,oShowalter, et al. v. G. H. Aunnelley Co., et al., zo Ky. 595 (924)-
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Up to this point we have been dealing with the ordinary active trust
in which the cestui has a valid enforceable interest, together with the
right to institute proceedings to recover the same in the event the trustee
fails or refuses to make regular payments of earnings or principal accord-
ing to the directions contained in the trust instrument. Mr. Perry, in
summarizing the problem of the creditor of the cestui que trust, says,
"As a rule creditors or persons who have rendered service to the cestui
may, by proceedings in equity, reach the beneficial interest including the
right to future income, unless there is a valid restraint upon alienation
or anticipation.""
The latter part of this comment will be devoted to a brief outline of
those classes of trusts of which Mr. Perry speaks, as imposing some
restraint on alienation or anticipation.
Those types of interests wherein the nature of the trust prevents
their subjection to payment of the cestui's debts may be classified into
five general groups as follows:
I. Where the cestuis interest is remote, uncertain, or contingent,
2"
2. Where the trustee's power of distribution is dicretionary, 0
3. Where the trust is designed for maintenance and support of the
cestui,a°
4- Where the particular debtor-cestui is one of a group of cestuis
whose interests are inseparable, 3
5- Where there is a spendthrift trust.2
The cases in the first class divide themselves into three groups;
"7 z Perry, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, Sec. 8 sa, page 1378.
-s Russell v. Milton, 133 Mass. 18o (188z); Hill v. Fulmer et al., 39 So. 53 (Miss.)
(a905); Myer v. Thompson et al., 35 Hun. (N.Y.) 561 (1885); First National Bank of
Spartanburg, S. C. et al. v. Dougan et al., 250 F. 52o (igi8).
29 Morris v. Daiker Admr. et al., 35 Ohio App. 394, 172 N.E. 540 (2929); Brown
v. Lumbert, trustee, 2za Mass. 429 (292S); Hall v. Williams et al., 12o Mass. 344-
(x876); Hinckley v. Williams et al., i Cush. (Mass.) 490 (1848; Wemyss v. White,
et al., 259 Mass. 484 (2893); Keyser v. Mitchell, 67 Pa. 473 (187); Banfield v. Wiggin
and Trustee, 58 N.H. 255 (2877); Wolfman v. Webster and Trustee, 77 N.H. 24 (1913);
Parker, trustee v. Carpenter, et al, 77 N.H. 453 (292S); Raymond v. Tiffany, er al,
222 N.Y.S. 252 (29o8).
" Fortner v. Phillips, 124 Ark. 395 (2926); Holmes, et al. v. Bushnell, et al., So
Conn. 233 (907); Baker v. Brown, et al., x46 Mass 369 (x888); Mitchell v. Choctaw
Bank, 107 Miss. 324, 65 So. 278 (1914); Chase v. Currier, 63 N.H. 90 (2884).
"1Brooks v. Raynolds, 59 F. 9Z3 (1893); Bell v. Watkins, 82 Ala. 52 (1886);
St. John, Admr. v. Dann, et al., 66 Conn. 4o (2895); The Tolland County Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Underwood, et al., 50 Conn. 493 (1883); McCann v. Taylor, et al., 2o
Md. 4x8 (1857); Brown v. Postell, 4 Rich. Eq. (S.C.) 71 (1852)5 Roberts, e al. v. Gall,
35 Vt. 28 (186i); Damhoff v. Shambaugh, et al., zoo Iowa xx55 (2925); Russell, et al.
v. Meyers, trustee, 2o2 Ky. 593 (29z4); Rudd v. Hagan, 86 Ky. x59 (1887); Talley,
et al. v. Ferguson, trustee, et al., 64. W. Va. 3z8 (igo8).
32 Congress Hotel Co. v. Martin, 312 I11 318, 243 N.E. 838 (924); Rose v.
Southern Mich. Nat. Bank, 2S5 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (2932); Flanagan v. Olderog,
226 N-.W. 316, 118 Neb. 745 (1929); L'Hommedieu v. L'Hommedieu, 98 N.J. Eq. 554,
232 A. 302 (1926); Keating v. Keating, 28z Iowa 1o56, x65 N.W. 74 (1917)-
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(a) those where the cestu?s interest is dependent upon the fulfillment
of a condition precedent, (b) those involving mere future or contingent
interests, and (c) those which are apt to be defeated by a condition
subsequent. In cases involving a condition precedent the courts invari-
ably deny the creditor relief; thus where a testator left his property in
trust for his son who was to have the principal of the fund "when he
shall become financially solvent and able to pay his just debts and liabil-
ities," relief was denied.3" There is some split of authority with regard
to mere future or contingent interests with the majority denying relief
on the theory that it is inequitable for the creditor to seize and destroy
the property of the cestui which is so uncertain and contingent that it
cannot be fairly appraised or sold. In a typical case34 where there was a
direction to hold a fund in trust for the testator's widow for life, and
on her death to divide the fund into as many parts as there were children
of their marriage then living, or having died, who had issue then living,
and to hold such parts in trust for them, it was held that during the life
time of the widow, a creditor of one of the testator's sons could not
subject his interest to payment of the debt, the court saying, "his (the
son's) interest, if vested, is uncertain and contingent," and not therefore
subject to payment of his debts." Of this class of cases Perry says, "A
remote, uncertain, contingent, beneficial interest cannot be reached." 6
The principal case is an illustration of the attitude of the courts with
respect to cases where the cestu 's interest is subject to the fulfillment of
a condition subsequent. Where, as in that case, the interest may be
wholly divested by the occurrence of the future event (unprofitable busi-
ness for three years), the courts will deny relief. But where the happen-
ing of the event operates merely to decrease the cestus interest the
courts will grant the creditor relief and subject the interest to the pay-
ment of the claim. Such a case was presented in the Federal Court"7
where the testatrix devised her property to her daughter in trust "for
herself and her children, born and to be born," and a creditor sought
to reach the daughter's interest. It was held there that "the possibility
of after born children lessening the interest of each beneficiary does not
convert the cestuj's estate into a bare contingency."
Of the cases falling within the second class Mr. Bogert says,"8 "If
25Hul v. Farmcrs Loan and Trust Co., 24S U.S. 312, 38 S. Ct. 103 (1917).
"Russell v. Milton, supra, note z8.
SS Creditors were successful in Thompson v. Zurich State Bank, 124 Kans. 425, z6o
Pac. 68 (9z7), contingent on living until brother comes of age. Dickison v. Ogden's
Ex'r., 89 Ky. x6z, iz S.W. 191 (x889), contingent on surviving parent. Reilly v. Mac-
!cnzie, xsx Md. zx6, 134 At. 5oz (19z6), son's interest dependent upon surviving
mother.
36 z Perry, TRUSTs, Sec. 8xSa, page 1380.
as First National Bank of Spartanburg, S. C., et al. v. Dougan, et al., supra, note z8.
s' Bogert, TRUSTS AND TRVITEES, 550.
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the trust is for the purpose of enabling the trustee to apply the income of
the trust res to the use of the beneficiary and is wholly discretionary, so
that the cestui may receive nothing at all, the creditors of the cestui
have no rights in the trust property or trust income prior to application
by the trustee." An Ohio case illustrating this principle is Morrs v.
Daiker39 in which the settlor devised her property in trust for her chil-
dren "to be paid at convenient intervals in the trustee's discretion and
in such amounts as he may deem proper." It was held that a "trust of
income and capital payable within the trustee's discretion does not pass
a vested interest to the beneficiary that may be reached by a judgment
creditor."
The rule seems to be logically sound since the fundamental principle
behind the creditor's subjecting the cestui's interest is the alienability of
that interest and if the power of the trustee is discretionary, so that the
cestui may get nothing, he has nothing which he may alienate. There
is the further cogent reason for the rule, as stated in Keyser v.
Mitchell," "To subject the income to an execution would end the
trustee's discretion and defeat the testator's intent." Maryland has held
in connection with such cases, that where it is made to appear that the
trustee unreasonably withholds payment with the purpose of defeating
the creditor's claim, the court will permit the creditor to maintain a bill
to reach the fund.4' A few states have allowed the creditor relief in
spite of discretionary clauses in the trust instrument.42
The courts will deny relief to the cestus creditors in the third class
of cases on the theory that a trust for the support or maintenance of the
cestui is one which is personal in character and cannot be made the sub-
ject of a creditor's bill. It has been held that the cestui of such a trust
has no interest which he can alienate and consequently there is nothing
for the creditor to receive." A case which aptly states the rule is Holmes,
et al. v. Bushnell, et al.4 where it is said, "The beneficiary of a testa-
mentary trust fund which is to be expended by the trustee only for his
personal comfort and support cannot pledge the future income of the
fund to the payment of his business losses; and therefore, if such a pledge
be attempted by him, a court of equity will not enforce it, nor in any
other way undertake to divert to business creditors of the beneficiary
what was clearly intended and is needed to secure him the necessaries
of life."
39 3S Ohio App. 394, 17z N.E. 540 (929).
40 67 Pa. 473 (x87).
"Pole v. Pietsch, et al., 61 Md. 570 (1883).
,
2 Marshall's Trustee v. Rash, et al., 87 Ky. 116 (1888).
'a Fortnerv. Phillips, 124 Ark. 395 (x916).
"8o Conn. 233 (1907).
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Cases falling within the fourth class refuse to give the creditor relief
on the ground that the interest of the cestuij, being one of a group, is
inseparable; and in the absence of a provision in the trust instrument
permitting partition will hold that it would be violative of the settlor's
intent to impose a lien on the entire estate for the benefit of a creditor
of a single cestui. Of course this rule has no application where the debt
was undertaken for the benefit of the entire group; consequently trusts
for the benefit of one person and his family may be subjected to payment
of such obligations. It might be noted in this connection that the most
common cases involving this point are those in which trusts have been
created for some designated person "and his family."
The cases falling vithin the fifth class, namely, spendthrift trusts,
are those in which the settlor has anticipated the problem of creditors
of the cestui and has sought to protect the estate against their claims.
Since the subject of spendthrift trusts constitutes a large field of the law
of trusts it is not feasible in this comment to do more than indicate some
of the characteristics and problems surrounding them. For an admirable
treatment of the subject, the reader is referred to Professor Griswold's
work 5 where he sets forth the subject in detail together with the case
history of this type of trust in each of the states.
A spendthrift trust may be briefly defined as an equitable interest,
usually for life (though it may be created for a term), the alienability
of which is restrained. No definite wording is necessary for their crea-
tion, but as a general rule there is usually a provision directing the trustee
to pay the income "into the hands" of the cestui. The cestui of such a
trust may enjoy all the benefits of the ordinary active trust, since his
interest is absolute, but at the same time his interest is immune from the
claims of his creditors.
The most serious question concerning this type of trust is that of
its validity. They have never been recognized in England"e, and the
American jurisdictions have divided on the issue. Those jurisdictions
refusing to sustain them do so because of the alienability restraint; thbse
which uphold them do so on the theory that the settlor is entitled to do
that which he wishes with his property."7
As indicated by Professor Griswold, the Ohio cases are in confusion,
and the problem has never been squarely presented in our courts. The
";Erwin N. Griswold, "Spendthrift Trusts" (1936); See also an article by White,
"Restraints on Alienation and Indestructible Trusts in Ohio" 2 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 333
(1928).
"The English Courts have recognized an exception in those cases where a married
woman is the cesiui of such a trust.
47A factor which is never considered when a devise conflicts with the rule against
perpetuities, etc.
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strong language used by Welch, J., in Hobbs v. Smith48 would seem to
reject them, and a still greater obstacle opposed to them would seem to
be the wording of the Code provision I 176o discussed above, which
makes any equitable interest of a judgment debtor subject to the claims
of his creditors.
The distinctions should be noted at this point between the spend-
thrift trust (where recognized), the trust for support and the discretion-
ary trust. In all three cases the interest of the cestuis is immune to the
claims of creditors, but for different reasons. In the case of the spend-
thrift trust immunity is the result of an express provision in the instru-
ment which prevents alienation; the cestuis interest in a trust for support
is, by its nature, incapable of being subjected to creditors' claims; and
the discretionary trust affords the creditor no relief because the bene-
ficiary has no property in the fund which he could compel the trustee to
pay to him. For a detailed discussion of these distinctions the reader is
referred to the Restatement of Trusts.4"
Professor Griswold points out, as has been indicated in the foregoing
part of this comment, that the Ohio courts have refused relief to the
creditor in those cases involving discretionary trusts, but this must not
be taken as indicating a favorable attitude toward spendthrift trusts
because of the distinctions observed above. The following quotation
from Ohio Jurisprudence0 serves also to support the contention advanced
above: "As to the right of a creditor to subject the income of a trust
established for the benefit of the judgment debtor, it seems to be defi-
nitely established by the Ohio decisions that if the beneficiary of the
trust has any vested separable interest therein, so that he could by action
compel the payment to himself by the trustee of any portion of the
income, such interest or portion would be within the reach of his cred-
itors in a creditors' suit. In other words, the creditors of the beneficiary
have such rights, but only such, against the trust estate as the beneficiary
himself might exercise."
In light of what has been said in this comment it appears that the
principal case was properly decided on its facts. The interest there cre-
ated in the defendant was not such an absolute, certain and uncondi-
tional one as to justify the court's granting the plaintiffs their requested
aid in execution. The interest of the defendant was subject to the opera-
tion of a condition subsequent and apt to be totally defeated by the
trustee's exercise of the power to liquidate the business following three
year's unprofitable operation. Of course, had there been an amount due
48 x5 Ohio St.419 (1864).
"' RrsTATEMENT, TRSuS, secs. 154, 1S5.
'o Vol. as., Creditors' Suits, Sec. Z3, page 1002.
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and owing the defendant by the trustee at the time of the proceeding
the court would have been justified in awarding that sum to the plain-
tiffs. In such a case the defendant would have had a vested separable
interest. However, the facts indicated that at the date of filing the peti-
tion the defendant's salary account was overdrawn, and there was no
assurance that the trust would continue in the future.
CHARLES A. REYNARD
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT-DEATH OF AGGRESSOR
IN AN AFFRAY
The Lick Run and Clay Company, a mining corporation in Athens
county, was involved in a miner's strike due to its "open shop" policy.
The decedent, Peter J. Merz, although owner of one-fifth of the stock
of the company and president of its board of directors, worked in the
mine as an ordinary employee, "filling coal." That he was an employee
of the company is admitted by both parties. During the strike the com-
pany had placed the decedent in charge of men to protect its property.
While off duty but on his way to the office of the company to make a
report, decedent was killed in a fight with his son-in-law, James
McManaway. It appears that the trouble between the two men was
a result of the labor dispute at the mine, McManaway being a supporter
of the union. It also appears that the decedent had been under the
influence of liquor and had engaged in an argument with, and had
threatened, McManaway at his home before the two men encountered
each other on the road where the killing took place, one and a half
miles from the mine. The application of the decedent's widow for com-
pensation was denied by the Industrial Commission. On appeal to the
common pleas and court of appeals her application was upheld. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision saying, "such death was
not compensable, there being no direct causal connection between the
employment and death." Merz v. Industrial Comm., 134 Ohio St. 36,
15 N.E. (2d) 632, II Ohio Op. 414 (938).
The Constitution of Ohio, Art. II, Sec. 35, provides as follows:
"For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their
dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease, occasioned in the
course of such workmen's employment, laws may be passed establishing
a state fund. . . . " The Ohio General Code, Sec. 1465-68, provides:
"Every employee . . . who is injured, and the dependents of such as
